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ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a property tax case. The property concemed is owned by a utility company 
(PacifiCorp) operating in several westem states. It is assessed by the Idaho State Tax 
Commission (Commission). Idaho property taxes for such a company are calculated by first 
determining the system, or unit, value. This is the total taxable value of the company's operating 
property. The next step determines what portion of this total value should be allocated to Idaho. 
The Idaho value is then apportioned to the various Idaho taxing districts in which PacifiCorp's 
property lies. The dispute in this case concerns the system value of the property. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Commission staff valued PacifiCorp's property for the 2008 tax year. PacifiCorp 
disagreed with the valuation and timely sought review by the State Board of Equalization 
(Board). The Board issued its decision lowering the value of the property. PacifiCorp timely 
filed a Petition for Judicial Review with the district court. The district court held a trial de 1l0VO 
resulting in the decision from which the Commission appeals. 
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS 
I. 
Glossary 
Cost approach one of the three indicators of value considered in arriving at an estimate 
of market value. There are various cost approaches. The appraisals in this case usc historical 
cost less depreciation (HCLD). 
Income approach - another of the three indicators of value considered in arriving at an 
estimate of market value. There arc a number of income approaches. 
APPELLATE BRIEF - I 
Market approach the third of the indicators of value considered in arriving at an 
estimate of market value. The classic market approach is to use sales of comparable properties 
to estimate the value of the property being appraised. When there are too few sales for this to be 
viable, a different technique known as 'stock and debt' is sometimes used. 
Functional obsolescence - obsolescence attributable to deficiencies (or superadequacies) 
in the propeliy being assessed. 
Economic, or external, obsolescence - obsolescence attributable to influences outside the 
property being appraised. 
[ncome shortfall - also known as capitalization of income loss, IS a method used to 
measure functional and external obsolescence. 
Deferred income tax - these arise when (I) customers pay rates set assuming income tax 
liabilities will be calculated using straight line depreciation (for example, 5 percent per year for 
20 years) but (2) tax liabilities are actually paid llsing accelerated depreciation. This provides the 
company with the benefit of higher early cash flows. (Johnson, Testimony of July 16, 2010 
(afternoon), pp 29-30.) 
2. 
Facts 
PacifiCorp is an electric utility operating in several western states. fn Marcb of 2006, 
PaciftCorp's then owner, Scottish Power, sold PacifiCorp to MiclAmerican Energy Holdings, a 
company wholly-owned by Berkshire Hathmvay. The sales price was $9.2 billion, with 55.1 
billion being cash and the remainder the assumption of debt and preferred stock. (Petitioner 
Exhibit 20, Tegarden Appraisal, p. \5.) [Note the Montana State Tax Appeals Board put the 
sale price at $9.4 billion. Paci/iCO/l) v. Department of Revenue, Stab No. CT 2006-5, CT 2007-
APPELLATE BRIEI~ - 2 
7, p. 14 (2011 WL 130102, Mont Tax Appeal Bd, 2011.)] After the purchase, MidAmerica 
Energy made Securities and Exchange Commission filings indicating the value of PacifiCorp's 
property, plant, and equipment, taking depreciation into account, was $10 billion. (Rudd, 
Testimony of July 14, 2010, pp. 122-23.) In addition, from 2006 to 2008 PacifiCorp added 
approximately $2 billion in additional plant. (Rudd, Testimony of July 14,2010, pp 123-24.) 
The Commission's expert, Mr. Eyre, valued the property at $11,007,000,000. 
(Respondent Exhibit 515, Review Appraisal of Eyre, p. 64 of 92.) The Commission's appraiser, 
Mr. Rudd, valued PacifiCorp's property at $9,273,982,721. (Petitioner Exhibit 4, Rudd 
Appraisal, p. 2.) The decision of the Commission valued the property at $8,877,075,014. 
(Petitioner Exhibit 6, Decision, p. 6.) PacifiCorp's expert, Mr. Tegarden, valued the property at 
$8,350,000,000. (Petitioner Exhibit 20, Tegarden Appraisal, p. 105.) 
rn the cost approach to value, Messrs Rudd, Eyre, and Tegarden substantially agree with 
one another to a point. Each appraisal uses HCLD in the cost approach. Eaeh appraisal starts 
with very similar historical cost. Each appraisal then subtracts depreciation obtained from 
information PacifiCorp provided the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on FERC Form 1. 
(Tegarden, Testimony of July 12, 20 I 0, pp 218-221; Eyre, Testimony of July 15, 2010, pp 308-
309) Unlike the other appraisals, the PacifiCorp appraisal goes on to subtract additional 
depreciation in the form of functional and economic obsolescence. PacifiCorp measures these 
two forms of obsolescence in the same way. (Tegarden, Testimony of July 14, 2010, p. 100, 
lines 4 - 9.) Mr. Tegarden calculates obsolescence as follows. He uses his "investor required 
rate of return" of 9.10 percent developed in his income approach and compares it to his lower 
expected rate of return of 7.20 percent. The lower rate of return is divided by the higher rate of 
return to yield 79.12 percent. Subtract this from 100 percent and the result is 20.88 percent. 
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This is the percentage of obsolescence Mr. Tegarden uses to attain his final cost approach value. 
(Petitioner Exhibit 20, Tegarden Appraisal, p. 27.) 
Additional facts will be cited when noted in the argument. I 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
May PacifiCorp deduct obsolescence from the cost approach to value without offering 
evidence of the cause of the obsolescence, the quantity of the obsolesccnce, and that the asserted 
obsolescence actually affects the property? 
ARGUMENT 
The Commission will argue that PacifiCorp's appraisal IS unreliable because it uses 
questionable techniques and impermissible assumptions to reach an untenable result. Although 
the Commission believes PacifiCorp's income approach is flawed, too, it will concentrate on the 
cost approach. The Commission will argue that the cost approach PacifiCorp used in its 
appraisal should be disallowed because it merely assumes obsolescence, a form of depreciation. 
It will show how obsolescence and its etTects can reliably be determined. 
A. 
PacifiCorp's Appraisal is Unreliable 
The following demonstrate several reasons PacifiCorp's appraisal is unreliable. 
( I ) 
Because PacitiCorp's self ... reported depreciation already includes obsolescence, 
it is improper t<Jr PacifiCorp to attempt to subtract it again 
I There is the possibility of confusion in the record. The testimony of the fourth day of trial, July 16,2010. is fOllnd 
in two binders. the second of which covers much of the testimony taken in the afternoon. When cited in this brief 
the atternoon testimony will be noted as sllch. When identifying exhibits. "Petitioner" is PacifiCorp. the Petitioner 
below; "Respondent'" is the Commission. 
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The Commission's appraiser (Rudd), the Commission's expert (Eyre), and PacifiCorp's 
expert (Tegarden) all use original cost information reported to FERC by PacifiCorp. They each 
subtract depreciation, also reported to FERC by PacifiCorp. Mr. Tegarden goes on to subtract 
additional depreciation in the form of obsolescence on the theory it was not captured in the 
depreciation PacifiCorp reported to FERC. (Petitioner Exhibit 20, Tegarden Appraisal, p. 27.) 
Obsolescence, however, is already captured in the PacifiCorp FERC filing. 
Title 18, part 10 1 of the Code of Federal Regulations prescribes a system of accounts for 
public utilities and licensees under the Federal Power Act. It defines depreciation. In pertinent 
part, that definition states that, as applied to depreciable electric plant, "Among the causes to be 
given consideration are wear and tear, decay, action of the elements, inadequacy, obsolescence, 
changes in the art, changes in demand and requirements of public authorities. [18 CFR part 
101, definition 12. Emphasis added.)] PacifiCorp's self-reported depreciation was supposed to 
include obsolescence. PacifiCorp either filed falsely with FERC or Mr. Tegarden seeks to 
subtract obsolescence twice. 
(2) 
It follows from the assumptions in PacifiCorp's appraisal 
that the company will always lose money 
PacifiCorp's own witnesses provide a conclusive reason its appraisal is unreliable. Based 
on the assumption that nct operating income (NOI) is the only benefit in owning PacitiCorp, they 
assert that PacifiCorp loses money and will always lose money. 
Mr. Tegarden's testimony includes a revealing comment in his analysis of the difference 
between real growth and nominal growth. 
Q. (1' you wouldn't mind explaining the difference between real growth 
and nominal growth, if you could? 
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A. Okay. Let's say we invest $1,000 at the beginning of the year into a 
group of assets, and use figures that we're fairly familiar with in this case. We 
found in our cost approach that this group of assets of PacifiCorp was earning 
approximately 7.2 percent rate of return. If we invest $1000 and earn a rate of 
return of 7.2 percent, at the end of the year, our assets will have grown to $1,072. 
But your cost of capital, as I found in my appraisal, was 9.1 percent. If 
you discount the present worth of that, that means the present worth of the right to 
receive the $1,072 is about 983 dollars today. So what you have is growth that's 
nominal growth, but you have no real growth. In fact, you've lost $17 of 
purchasing power. 
You could take, then, the 900 million dollars that PacitiCorp has in their 
construction work in progress account and say, well, we're earning about 7.2 
percent. That's what we've been earning in the past. It looks like we could do 
that. So we could put 900 million and grow that at 7.2 percent for one year. And 
we would have 965 million. 
So sure, you have the illusion of growth, but again, doing that same type 
of calculation .... Let's discount it back at 9.1, solve for present value, we get an 
84. So we've lost some 16 million of purchasing power. So it looks like it's a 
bad investment. 
(Tegarden, Testimony of July 16, 2010, pp 80-82.) 
Mr. Tegarden, in short, asserts that his appraisal shows PacifiCorp currently losing money on 
every dollar it invests. 
Mr. McDougal, a company officer, asserts that PacifiCorp will always lose money on 
every dollar it invests. 
Q. Over the long run, do you believe that rate regulated utilities like 
PacitiCorp will earn over its cost rate of capital? 
A. No, I do not. 
Q. Why not? 
A. If you look at the whole regulatory process, once we get an item into 
rate base we wi II recover our cost of capital. Because of lag when we make the 
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investment and when that investment is in rate base, there's always going to be a 
time period where we don't recover it. 
(McDougal, Testimony of July 16,2010, 133, lines 11 - 24.) 
According to their witnesses, PacifiCorp not only fails to earn over its cost of capital, it 
will forever earn less than its cost of capital. As Mr. Tegarden implied, for an investment to be 
worthwhile, the retum on the investment must exceed its cost of capital. Mr. McDougal asserts 
that PacifiCorp will never even attain its cost of capital, let alone go over it. PacifiCorp, 
according to Messrs Tegarden and McDougal, must always operate in the red! 
The obvious question, then, is why would anyone, especially Berkshire Hathaway, ever 
invest in PacifiCorp? There are two possibilities. The first is that Mr. Tegarden's appraisal is 
wrong because PacifiCorp does yield benefits in excess of what Mr. Tegarden assumes. The 
second is that investors are incompetent. 
PacifiCorp maintains it will never recover its cost of capital from rate base. Does 
ownership of PacitiCol'P provide benefits other than NOI derived from rate base? Mr. Tegarden 
denies it. (Tegarden, Testimony of July 16, 20 I 0, p. 72, lines 6 - 16.) Both Dr. Johnson and 
Mr. Eyre suggest deferred income tax is an additional benefit. (Johnson, Testimony of 
July 16,2010 (afternoon) pp 79-80; Eyre, Testimony of July 15,2010, p. 290, lines 16 - 24.) 
Both Mr. McDougal and Mr. Tegarden dispute this. (McDougal, Testimony of July 16,2010, 
p. 130 and 131; Tegarden, Testimony of July 16, 20 I 0, p. 72, lines 17 - 21.) Warren Buffet does 
not. 
Berkshire has access to two low-cost, non-perilous sources of leverage 
that allow us to sately own t~lr more assets than our equity capital alone would 
permit: deterred taxes and "float," the funds of others that our insurance business 
holds because it receives premiums before needing to payout losses. Both of 
these funding sources have grown rapidly and now total about $68 billion. 
Better yet, this funding to date has been cost-fi·ee. Deferred tax liabilities 
bear no interest...Neither item, of course, is equity; these are real liabilities. But 
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they are liabilities without covenants or due dates attached to them. In effect, they 
give us the benefit of debt - an ability to have more assets working for us - but 
saddle us with none of its drawbacks. 
Pac(liCorp v. State o/Montana, Dept. of Revellue, Cause Nos. CT 2006-5, CT-2007-7, 2011 WL 
130102 p. 34 (Mont. Tax App. Bd, 2011, quoting Warren Buffet in Berkshire Hathaway's 2008 
Annual Report.) 
Dr. Johnson, one of the Commission's expelis, estimates that by taking deferred income 
taxes into account, PacifiCorp's real cost of capital is approximately 7°;;), not 9.1 %. (Johnson, 
Testimony of July 16, 2010 (afternoon), p. 89, lines 17-25, and p. 90, line 1.) Because 
PacifiCorp's return on investment is above 7 percent, it suddenly looks like a company Warren 
Buffett might choose to buy, rather than a company doomed always to lose money. 
Finally, in Silver Blaze, Sherlock Holmes solves the case noting the dog that did not 
? bark.- There is a dog that does not bark in this case, too. A 137 -page confidential memorandum 
goes into great detail concerning PacitiCorp's prospects for the years 2008 through 2017. One 
might expect that if the company was doomed to lose money, word would have leaked out. Yet 
on this calamity the document is silent. [Respondent's Exhibit 516, PacifiCorp 2008-2017 Ten 
Year Plan (sealed).] PacitiCorp envisions making money, not losing it. Mr. Tegarden's critical 
assertion that the cost of capital exceeds the return on investment must be wrong. 
(3) 
PacifiCorp's appraisal assigns zero valuc to property 
not includcd in rate base 
Regulators generally do not allow property purchased with deferred income taxes to be 
included in rate base. (Petitioncr Exhibit 20, Tcgarden Appraisal, p. 30.) Mr. Tegardcn asserts 
that PacifiCorp offers no bcnetits othcr than NO!. (Tegarden, Testimony of July 16,20 I 0, p. 72, 
2 Gregory (Scotland Yard detective): "Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw my attention'!" 
Holmes: "To the curioLls incident of the dog in the night-time." 
Gregory: "The dog did nothing in the night-time," 
lIolmes: "That was the curious incident." 
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lines 4-16.) It follows that PacifiCorp's NOI is derived from property in rate base. When 
PacifiCorp's appraisal assigns value to property using only its contribution to NOI, it assigns 
zero value to property not included in rate base. Is this property really worth nothing? If so, 
why was it purchascd in the first placc? Imagine being shown multi-million dollar additions to 
plant and equipment and then being told its value is zero. We would look askance at the speaker 
to see ifhe was joking. Yct this is what PacitiCorp's appraisal asserts. 
In an Oregon property tax case, the Oregon Tax Court agreed with the taxpayer that there 
should be deductions from value for prope11y purchased using defcrred income tax and 
investment tax credit funds. It explained these deductions on the theory that the property was not 
included in rate base and, therefore, not contributing to the taxpayer's income. This is the same 
theory PacifiCorp espouses here. The Oregon Supreme Court rcversed, holding that property 
acquired using deferred income tax and investment tax credit funds has intrinsic value. Pacific 
Power & Light Company v. Department o.lRevenue, State (~f Oregon, 775 P. 2d 303 (at 308), 
308 Or 49 (at 57-58), (S. Ct. Or. 1989). 
(4) 
PacifiCorp's appraisal ignores, on spurious grounds, 
the sale of this property only twenty-one months 
before the appraisal date 
In March 2006, Scottish Powcr sold PacifiCorp to Berkshirc-Hathaway (through 
MidAmcrican Holding Company.) (Petitioncr's Exhibit 20, Tcgardcn Appraisal, p. 93.) Thc 
sale was for S9.2, of which S5.1 billion was cash and $4.1 billion \vas assumption of dcbt. Mr. 
Tcgardcn did not usc this information in arriving at his opinion of value. "It was an invcstmcnt 
value sale, in my opinion, not an indication of markct valuc." (Tcgardcn, Tcstimony of July 16, 
2010, p. 99, lines 19-21.) Why was thc salc not a markct value sale? "Investment valuc is the 
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specific value to an investor or specific group of investors as opposed to the typical investor. 
The purchaser here was - I don't believe was the typical investor." (Tegarden, Testimony of 
July 16, 2010, pp 99 - 100.) In fact, Mr. Tegarden believes that Berkshire-Hathaway is a unique 
purchaser. "It's difficult to imagine another buyer with similar access to capital which operates 
on a similarly patient and long-teml view." (Petitioner Exhibit 20, Tegarden Appraisal, p. 94.) 
In a nutshell, Mr. Tegarden considers the sale, but then ignores it on the grounds that Berkshire-
Hathaway is a unique buyer. 
This analysis ignores Idaho's statutory definition of market value. That definition 
essentially requires an arm's-length transaction between a willing, infOlmed buyer and a willing 
seller, under no compunction to sell. [Idaho Code § 63-20 I (15)]. That is what we have in the 
sale of the company from Scottish Power to Berkshire-Hathaway. Pac[jiCorp v. Department of 
Revenue, Stab No. CT 2006-5, CT 2007-7, p. 142011 WL 130102, (Mont Tax Appeal Bd, 2011, 
noting testimony of PacitiCorp's CFO.) If Mr. Tegarden wishes to disregard the sale of the 
property that meets the statutory definition of a market sale, he cannot do so by asserting it is not 
a market sale. 
Mr. Tegarden made the same "investment value" argument for the same sale before the 
Montana Board of Tax Appeals. It was rejected. Pac[jiCo'7) v. State of Montana, Dept. (~l 
Revenue, Cause Nos. CT 2006-5, CT-2007-7, 20 II WL 130 I 02 p. 22-23 (Mont. Tax App. Bd, 
20 II) 
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(5) 
PacifiCorp's appraisal surreptitiously and 
dramatically changes the weighting of the income approach 
and cost approaches when determining the final value 
In order to lower the final appraised value, PacifiCorp must diminish the importance of 
the cost indicator of value. It does this in two ways. First, it assigns little weight to the cost 
indicator. That is the subject of this section. Second, it adjusts the cost indicator downward to 
be closer to the income indicator. That is the subject of the following section. 
All three approaches to value (market approach, cost approach and income approach) 
should be considered, if not used, when determining value. (lDAPA 35.01.03.217.02.) In this 
case, both the Commission's appraiser and PacifiCorp's appraiser determined that the market 
approach was not useful due to a lack of available data. (Petitioner's Exhibit 20, Tegarden 
Appraisal, p. 104; Petitioner's Exhibit 4, Rudd Appraisal, p. 5.)] (Mr. Eyre did develop a market 
approach as he had more information by the time he issued his report.) The income approach 
and cost approach were used to develop a final value. In developing this final value, the 
Commission's appraiser relied on the cost approach for 45 percent and the income approach 
for 55 percent. This is stated clearly in the Commission's appraisal report. (Petitioner's Exhibit 
4, Rudd Appraisal, p. 6.) The Commission's expert, Mr. Eyre, also clearly indicates the weight 
he gave the various approaches he developed. (Respondent Exhibit 515, Review Appraisal of 
Eyre, p. 62-63 of 92.) 
Paci tiCorp 's appraisal does not state the weight given each appraisal. Paci tiCorp does 
not want to draw attention to its weighting. Nevertheless, the district court noted the weight 
given each could be calculated. PacitiCorp's cost approach was given 19 percent weight, while 
the income approach \vas given 81 percent. (Memorandum of Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
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of law, September 16, 2010, p. 16.) Note that 19 percent is slightly less than Mr. Eyre's 
weighting even though he considered all three indicators of value while PacifiCorp considered 
only two. 
(6) 
The appraisal uses "obsolescence in the air" 
to reduce the cost approach to the income 
approach rather than develop a cost approach that 
stands on its own 
PacifiCorp impemlissibly uses the assumption of obsolescence to reduce the cost 
approach to the income approach. It does this by using the same "investor required rate of 
return" it used to develop the income approach. Stripped of its gloss, the basic argument is: (1) 
the cost approach yields a value significantly higher than the income approach, (2) the reason for 
the discrepancy must be obsolescence, therefore (3) use the percentage difference between the 
assumed actual rate of return and the assumed "investor required rate of return" to detemline the 
assumed obsolescence. Now the income approach and cost approach agree. The reasoning is 
circular and has the result of gutting the cost approach to value by relying on a critical income 
approach factor to calculate the cost approach. The Oregon Tax Court and Oregon Supreme 
Court recognized this. 
In United Telephone Co. v. Dept (?lRevenlle, 770 P.2d 43 (S. Ct. Or. 1989), the Oregon 
courts t~lced the same conceptually deficient analysis PacifiCorp uses in this case. In that case, 
both the state's appraiser and Dr. Davis, the taxpayer's appraiser started, as here, with HClD. 
Dr. Davis then subtracted, as Paci tiCorp docs here, a figure for obsolescence. As in this case, the 
essential calculation in determining obsolescence was to take the projected earnings of the 
company and compare it to claimed required earnings. The difference between the two, when 
capitalized, supposedly retlects the amount of obsolescence. 
APPEllATE BRIEF - 12 
The Oregon courts were not fooled. The Oregon Supreme Court noted that the tax court 
rejected Dr. Davis's theory of obsolescence. The "mathematical logic" of Dr. Davis's approach 
converts the cost approach to an income approach. "Algebraically, the method cancels all cost in 
excess of the value indicated by the income approach as obsolescence." 
In theory, each approach [to valuation] views the concept of value from a 
different perspective, with the intent of considering all facts and perspectives 
relevant in the result in the marketplace. Adjusting one approach to make it rely 
on the result in the same indication of value as another approach effectively 
eliminates a relevant perspective from consideration. 
United Telephone, 770 P. 2d 43 at 51. 
In this case, PacifiCorp makes the same mistake. PacifiCorp arrives at its improbably 
precise weighting of 81 percent for the income approach and 19 percent for the cost approach 
because it comingled the two approaches. The approaches are not different perspectives on 
value; they are the same approach. The methodology reduces the cost approach to the income 
approach because it relies, I ike the income approach, on the estimate of the income stream (rate 
of retum) and the estimate of the capitalization rate (required rate of retum.) (Eyre, Testimony 
of July 14-15,2010, p. 306, lines 6-9.) The cost approach should provide a different perspective 
on the estimate of value. In the PacifiCorp appraisal, it does not. 
(7) 
Obsolescence is not the only explanation for the difference 
between the income and cost approaches 
PacifiCorp's appraisal assumes that obsolescence is the only thing that can account for a 
substantial difference between the income and cost indicators of value. There are other 
possibilities. Skill of the workforce, labor costs, and the level of competition suggest 
themselves. Bad management can certainly depress a company's expected rate of retum. 
Mr. Tegarden's approach does not allow this to be considered. Mr. Tegarden states, "We always 
APPELLATE BRIEF - 13 
assume typical management, not extraordinarily good nor extraordinarily bad." (Tegarden, 
Testimony of July 14, 2010, P. 101, lines 10-12.) But if there is bad management and it is 
assumed to be average, then assuming the resultant diminution in value to be caused by 
obsolescence is a mistake. It is a mistake PacifiCorp's approach will always make because 
PacifiCorp assumes obsolescence is the only possible caLIse of a depressed rate of return. 
(8) 
PacifiCorp's method of determining 
obsolescence is too subjective 
PacifiCorp's approach to obsolescence is far too subjective. Want more obsolescence to 
drive value down'? Lower your estimate of the expected rate of return. Raise the estimated rate 
of return required of investors. Do both. Do anything to increase the difference between the 
hypothetical required rate of return and the expected rate of return, and obsolescence 
automatically increases. Call whatever manipulation of the data you need to obtain the desired 
result "appraisal jUdgment" and that result is justified. 
The subjectivity in determining the required rate of return is on display in this case. 
PacitiCorp's 9.10 percent is higher than either the Commission's (8.89 percent) or Mr. Eyre's 
(8.72 percent). These are significant differences. As Mr. Eyre notes, the difference in the rates 
by itself results in a $400 million difference in value between Mr. Tegarden's approach and his 
own. (Eyre, Testimony of July 14-15, p. 306, lines 19-22.) Another example of excessive 
subjectivity is given in Mr. Tegarden's appraisal of PacifiCorp for 2005. rn that appraisal, he 
indicated PacitiCorp's ohsolescence f~lCtor was 30.56 percent, halfagain as high as his figure for 
only three years later. P(leijiCorp v. Department of Revenue, Stab No. CT-2005-3, 2007 WL 
2220872 p. 10 (Montana Tax Ap Bd 2007). 
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One does not need to challenge Mr. Tegarden's integrity to realize that the approach to 
obsolescence he uses is subject to serious distortion and manipulation. It should be rejected. 
B. 
Complex Appraisals Can be Made More Reliable if 
Evidence is Required to Show Causes of Obsolescence, the 
Quantity of Obsolescence, and that the Obsolescence 
Really Affects the Property in Question 
How can the determination of obsolescence be made more reliable? The answer is to 
insist on proof of its cause, amount, and that the obsolescence really affects the property. 
Several cases follow this approach. 
In Ellrr~Fesh, fnc. v. Graham County, 187 P.3d 530, 218 Ariz. 382 (Az. C1. App 2007) 
the property in question was a greenhouse owned by the largest U.S. supplier of greenhouse 
tomatoes. The county and the taxpayer agreed that it was appropriate to begin the valuation 
analysis with replacement cost. The taxpayer's expert then deducted 40 percent for external 
obsolescence on the basis that he observed obsolescence in the properties he used for comparable 
sales. The appellate court disallowed this deduction stating: 
We hold that, as a matter of law, a taxpayer claiming external obsolescence must 
offer probative evidence of the cause of the claimed obsolescence, the quantity of 
such obsolescence, and that the asserted cause of the obsolescence actually affects 
the subject property. 
Elm~Fesh, 187 P.3d 530 at 538. 
This view was adopted by the Minnesota Tax Court in American O:},srai Sligar CompallY 
l'. County o/Po/k, 2009 WL 2431376 (Minn. Tax Ct. 20(9), a case interesting for other reasons 
as well. The taxpayer was a sugar beet processor claiming both functional and economic 
obsolescence. The court considered these separately, looking at the causes of each. In awarding 
a reduction in value for functional obsolescence, the court focused on specific equipment and, 
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with respect to plant, inefficient layout, unused space, ceiling height, column size, and pillar 
sIzes. These very specific considerations justifying functional obsolescence contrast with 
PacifiCorp's evidence in this case, which is simply that the income shortfall approach captures 
both functional and economic obsolescence. 
With respect to economic obsolescence, the American O),stal court noted three different 
analyses might be considered. One of these was the income shortfall method, which the court 
did not employ because the propeliy in question was not rental property. Instead, the court 
focused on an alternative methodology for determining whether economic obsolescence existed. 
In this case, despite the fact that PacifiCorp's property is not rental property, the PacifiCorp 
appraisal uses the income shortfall method to show obsolescence of both types. 
Indiana adopted a Ellrr~lresh analysis even before Arizona did. In Waf Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Wayne Tp. Assessor, 825 N.E.2d 485 (Ind. Tax 2005) Wal Mart appealed a decision denying it 
a 95 percent obsolescence adjustment based on the fact that the store stood for only thirteen days 
before being torn down to make way for a new, improved Wal Mart store. The court stated that 
to establish obsolescence, a taxpayer must identify the causes of the alleged obsolescence, 
quantify the amount of obsolescence to be applied to its improvements, and connect each of 
these considerations to an actual loss in property value. The court denied obsolescence because 
Wal Mart maintained the old store was worth only salvage value but offered no support for the 
conclusion that salvage value corresponded to a 95 percent obsolescence adjustment. 
Callal Square Limited Partllership v. State Board of'Tax Commissioner.'i, 694 N.E. 2d 
~O 1 (Ind. Tax 1(98) is a case in which the income sholifall method to determine obsolescence 
was upheld. The taxpayer owned an apartment complex. It provided a detailed analysis of the 
types of problems giving rise to the income shortfall. These included superadequate construction 
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required by the city of Indianapolis, an electrical substation on the site, and the excessively 
narrow floor plan of certain units. 
Even though the court denied the claim for obsolescence, BASF COlp. Coating & Ink 
Divisioll v. Belvidere Tmvn, 23 N.J. Tax 551 (N.J. Tax Ct. 2007) provides an example of the so11 
of evidence that should be presented to justify an obsolescence claim. The claim was for 
functional obsolescence. At issue was the value of an individual plant. The appraiser noted that 
areas of the plant were idle or non-useable space that did not contribute to the manufacturing 
process, but which did cause excess costs for utilities, personnel, and maintenance. In addition, 
areas of the facility were hindered by low ceiling heights that precluded the installation of 
modern equipment. The appraiser compared the plant to a more modern plant, calculated that the 
comparison plant produced a given amount of product with a given floor space devoted to 
manufacturing, and then calculated the amount of floor space that should be necessary for the 
plant being appraised to produce tbe amount of product it generated. The difference between the 
amount of floor space needed and the greater amount actually available was obsolescence. 
In contrast to the detail provided in Canal Square and BASF, PacifiCorp asserts two 
causes of economic obsolescence of more than 20 percent; regulatory lag and the fact that PUC's 
do not allow for the inclusion in rate base of assets financed with deferred income taxes. 
(Petitioner Exhibit 20, Tegarden Appraisal, pp. 30 and 33.) If regulatory lag accounts for any 
obsolescence at all, it cannot possibly account for much. In 2005, the average regulatory lag in 
getting new plant and equipment into rate base was 6.2 months with the expectation that this will 
be reduced to 3.3 months. (Respondent's Exhibit 522. p. 2, Confidential Valuation Summary for 
PacifiCorp (sealed).] Assume a conservative 20-year life for plant and equipment. A delay of 6 
months in getting the asset into rate base means the asset \vill not be earning for only 2.5 percent 
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of its anticipated life. A delay of 3.3 months is little more than half that. These figures cannot 
possibly translate into obsolescence of better than 20 percent. As to assets purcbased with 
deferred income tax not being included in rate base, one should ask why, if this is a drag on 
profits, any company would choose to finance assets using deferred income tax? Assuming, 
arguelldo, that this is a legitimate claim for obsolescence, two points arise. First, why should we 
assume that PacifiCorp did not already self-report this form of depreciation in its FERC filing? 
Obsolescence is, as previously noted, included in the FERC definition of depreciation. Second, 
this is an example of something that should be quantified. How much of PacifiCorp's assets are 
not included in rate base because they were financed by deferred income taxes? We are not told. 
It is only asserted that it must be enough to justify more than 20 percent obsolescence. 
PacifiCorp otTers no explanation for any functional obsolescence. 
C. 
Because Its Appraisal is Defective 
PacifiCorp did not Meet Its Burden of Proof 
The appraisal PacitiCorp depends upon for its valuation is unreliable. In relying on what 
is unreliable, Paci fiCorp has not met its burden of proof. 
Idaho Code ~ 63-409(2) provides that in an appeal from the Commission's valuation of 
operating property, "the burden of proof shall fall upon the party seeking affirmative relief to 
establish that the valuation from which the appeal is taken is erroneous." Moreover, the burden 
of proof has two parts. The taxpayer must prove the Commission's value is wrong and that its 
value is right. Ahhot v. State Tax Commission, 88 Idaho 200, 398 P. 2d 221 (1965). In Abbot, 
the taxpayer was able to show that his property was assessed using an improper methodology. 
The opinion does not reflect the taxpayer demonstrating what the value of the property really 
was. The Court refused relict~ noting that "the fact we have found that the criteria of valuc 
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admittedly used by the assessor in determining the assessed valuation upon appellant's property 
was erroneous, it does not necessarily follow that the value fixed is not its full cash value." 
Abbot, 88 Idaho 200 at 208. 
In this case, both the demonstration that the Commission's value is incorrect and that 
PacifiCorp's suggested value is correct depend upon a deficient cost approach as well as the 
failure to consider the prior sale and subsequent additions to plant and equipment. PacifiCorp 
has not met its burden of proof. 
CONCLUSION 
Proof should be offered as to the cause of obsolescence, the amount of obsolescence, and 
that the obsolescence actually affects the property. PacifiCorp did not do this. Its cost approach 
is therefore flawed. Because the cost approach is flawed, PacifiCorp's appraisal is flawed. 
Because its appraisal is flawed, PacifiCorp did not meet its burden of proof in showing either 
that the State Board of Equalization's value is incorrect or that its suggested value is correct. 
The Commission respectfully requests this court uphold the value in the State Board of 
Equalization's decision. 
DATED this __ day of September 2011. 
CARL E. OLSSON 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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